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REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURTS FROM STATE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES*
THE availability of federal removal jurisdiction may frustrate a state's pur-
pose in establishing administrative agencies for the primary determination of
certain issues. Federal courts have original jurisdiction over cases arising
"under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States" without re-
gard to the parties' citizenship, and over state causes of action when citizenship
is diverse.' State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over most "federal-
question" and all diversity cases,2 but section 1441 of the Judicial Code,'
with certain exceptions, gives defendants a right to remove to federal court
any state-court action which could have been brought in the federal forum
originally.4 Procedurally, the defendant petitions a district court 5 to accept
jurisdiction of the action, and the case is thereupon lodged in that court sub-
*Tool & Die Makers Ass'n v. General Elec. Co., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1958).
2. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 gives Congress the power to withdraw jurisdiction from
state to federal courts in certain cases; except when Congress has expressly provided for ex-
clusive jurisdiction in federal courts, state jurisdiction is retained. Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-27 (1820); Note, 70 HAiv. L. Ray. 509 (1957); see I Moa-a,
FEDERAL PpAcTcE g 0.6[3] (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as Moour]; Sternberg, Di-
versity Jurisdiction, 10 NoRE DA E LA w. 219, 225-27 (1935).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
4. See 1 Mooa.E 'i 0.60[9], at 662; cf. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 348 (1816) (removal implied, not express, constitutional right).
Cases in which the basis of federal jurisdiction would be diversity of citizenship may
be removed only if the defendant is not a citizen of the state in which the action is initiated.
Thus, a plaintiff can prevent determination in a federal court by bringing his action in the
courts of the defendant's state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
If the state court had no proper jurisdiction of the action the federal court may not
accept jurisdiction on removal even though the action could originally have been brought
in the federal court. See Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 127, 131 (1926);
Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). But see Union
Terminal Ry. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 119 Fed. 209 (W.D. Mo. 1902). The underlying
theory is that the federal court's jurisdiction on removal is derivative and dependent on
proper jurisdiction in the state court. Southern States Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co.,
26 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.S.C. 1939).
Removal is expressly denied in certain classes of cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (1958) ; see
S. REP. No. 1768, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); Frankfurter,' Ditribution of Judicial
Power Between United States and Stale Cotirts, 13 QORN;EL L.Q. 499, 517 (1928).
5. Prior to the-recodification of title 28 in 1948, most petitions for removal had to
be filed with the state court from which removal was sought. Act of 'March 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 29, 36 Stat. 1095. If removal was denied from the state court the defendant could
nonetheless petition for removal again in the federal court, that court determining the
validity of defendant's jurisdictional allegations. See Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v.
Missouri R.R. & Warehouse Comm'rs, 183 U.S. 53 (1901); Removal Cases, 100 U.S.
457, 471-76 (1879).
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ject to remand on the judge's own motion 6 or at the request of the plaintiff.'
When defendants have attempted to remove from tribunals not conforming
to usual conceptions of a court, such as tax review boards and boards evalu-
ating property in eminent domain proceedings, plaintiffs, relying on that
language in section 1441 limiting removal to actions initiated in "state courts,"
have maintained that such state forums are administrative, therefore not
"courts" for removal purposes.8
Federal courts have long recognized such a functional distinction between
"administrative agencies" and "courts," but have never formulated satisfactory
standards for its application. One early case held that substitution of a board
of freeholders for a jury in eminent domain proceedings did not transform
a "court" into an "agency." 9 Similarly, state courts reviewing agency deter-
minations are still courts, despite plaintiffs' contentions that review is no more
than a continuation of an admittedly administrative proceeding. 10 But a forum
labeled a "county court" was found to be actually an administrative agency
because, in reviewing tax assessments, it was "only authorized to determine
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1958) ; see Barnes v. Parker, 126 F. Supp. 649, 650 (W.D. Mo.
1954) ; Mayner v. Utah Const. Co., 108 F. Supp. 532, 534 (W.D. Ark. 1952) ; Dynamic
Mfrs., Inc. v. Local 614, Gen. Drivers, 103 F. Supp. 651, 652 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
7. The plaintiff would move to remand under FEo. R. Civ. P. 7(b). See Steingut v.
National City Bank, 36 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
Two opinions exist as to the proper action to be taken by a district court in doubt as
to whether it can properly assume jurisdiction. One view is that since an order remanding
a case is not appealable, the district court should assume jurisdiction; otherwise the de-
fendant will be denied a federal forum. McLaughlin v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 F,2d
177, 184 (E.D. La. 1925). The other, the majority view, is that "where the jurisdiction
of the federal court is doubtful, good judgment requires remand to the District Court of
the state, the jurisdiction of which is beyond dispute." Pabst v. Roxana Petroleum Co.,
30 F.2d 953, 954 (S.D. Tex. 1929); accord, Lorraine Motors, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 166 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1958) ; Smith v. Voss Oil Co., 166 F. Supp. 905 (D. Wyo.
1958); Babb v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 247 (W.D.S.C. 1952).
8. See, e.g., Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890); Searl v. School Dist.
No. 2, 124 U.S. 197 (1888) ; Colorado Midland Ry. v. Jones, 29 Fed. 193 (D. Colo. 1886).
9. Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, supra note 8.
10. E.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934) ; Range Oil
Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 140 F. Supp. 283 (D. Minn. 1956) ; see In re
Judicial Ditch No. 24, 87 F. Supp. 198 (D. Minn. 1949) (state court acts administratively
in approving drainage plan but judicially in reviewing its own order) ; 3 DAvis, ADMIN-
ISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 23.16, at 370-71 (1958) [hereinafter cited as DAvIs]. See alko
Wallace, Are Workmen's Compensation Cases Triable in Federal District Courtsf, 7
LA. L. Ray. 350, 356-57 (1947).
In two recent cases involving condemnation of land by private corporations, however,
removal was denied on the grounds that judicial review of administrative orders was an
integral part of condemnation proceedings, and that no "original" jurisdiction existed
in a federal court. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954) (alternative
holding) ; Collins v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955). Similar
results have been reached in cases involving attempts to remove appeals of orders of state
workmen's compensation boards. E.g., Snook v. Industrial Comm'n, 9 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.
Ill. 1934).
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questions of quantity, proportion and value," and had no "judicial powers."'"
A state "commission" empowered to determine riparian rights of competing
claimants was also not a court,1 2 principally because such judicial procedures
as the filing of a formal complaint and answer were not used 13 and the com-
mission had no authority to grant affirmative relief.' 4 Aside from revealing
an unwillingness to be bound by the wholly semantic analysis or by the name
which the state has given the forum in question, such cases provide little
aid to a judge faced with an attempted removal from a doubtful state forum.
Since state legislatures have increasingly granted to administrative agencies
functions formerly exercised by courts, 1 attempts to remove from these bodies
will probably become more frequent, and the federal courts, in deciding
whether a state forum is a "court" for removal purposes, will in all likelihood
attempt to formulate new and more meaningful standards.
The problem of a state forum's nature for removal purposes confronted the
court in Tool & Die Makers Ass'z z. General Elec. Co.10 There, a union
filed complaints with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, alleging
that General Electric had violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement
by failing to pay proper vacation benefits, changing seniority rights and in-
centive rates, and unilaterally altering work rules.-- This board was em-
powered, concurrently with state courts, to hear breach-of-contract claims,
but, unlike the courts, had no authority to award damages and could only
issue cease-and-desist orders.'8 Three weeks before the date set by the board
for a hearing, General Electric filed removal petitions in federal court; juris-
diction was claimed under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which
provides that a breach-of-contract action between an employer and a labor
11. Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890). See also In re Jarnecke Ditch,
69 Fed. 161 (D. Ind. 1895).
12. In re Silvies River, 199 Fed. 495 (D. Ore. 1912), aff'd sub nom. Pacific Live
Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1915).
13. In re Silvies River, supra note 12, at 501-02; see Fuller v. County of Colfax, 14
Fed. 177 (D. Neb. 1882).
14. In re Silvies River, stpra note 12, at 499.
15. GELIHORN & BYSE, ADMINISTATIvE LAw-CAsEs 4 (1954); Burton, Adinin-
istrative Procedure Before Certain Agencies of the State, 17 ALA LAw. 125 (1956);
Newman, Two Decades of Administrative Law in California: A Critique, 44 CA r. L.
REv. 190, 194 (1956) ; cf. 1 DAvis § 1.09. In fact, assumption of judicial power by ad-
ministrative agencies has been attacked as violating separation of power clauses in state
and federal constitutions. In New Hampshire a plan for administrative handling of
litigation arising from automobile accidents was abandoned when the justices of that
state declared that the proposed agency would violate the state constitution. N.H. S. Bill
No. 37, Jan. 1935 Sess., in 110 .LR. 820; Re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 492, 179
Atl. 344 (1935). For the view that administrative officers are not competent to perform
judicial functions, see Katcher, Are Adminitrative Agencies Ujurping Judicial Powers?,
30 N.Y.S.B. Bum. 442, 445 (1958).
16. 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
17. Id. at 949.
I& Wis. STAT. Axx. §§ 111.06(1)(f), 111.07(1) (1957).
19601
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
organization can be brought in a federal court.10 The union moved to remand
the case on the ground that the board was not a "state court" within the mean-
ing of section 1441 .20
The district judge denied remand. He first stressed the nature of the action,
noting that the complaint was based on breach of contract and that the union
could have initiated its suit in a Wisconsin trial court;21 had that procedure
been followed the defendant could unquestionably have removed. The court
then looked to the procedures employed iby the 'board and found that they
revealed its "judicial character."2' The board's inability to enforce its own
orders was not considered significant.23 A state cannot, the court reasoned,
19. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301 (a), 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
20. 170 F. Supp. at 948; See Brief of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Anicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent's Motion for Remand, pp. 2-4.
The union also resisted removal on the ground that Westinghouse Salaried Employees
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), foreclosed federal jurisdiction. That
case held § 301(a) inapplicable to alleged contract breaches affecting only individual
rights as distinct from breaches affecting the union as an entity. The court questioned tile
validity of Westinghouse in the light of subsequent cases, but held that the breaches alleged
by the union were within the scope of § 301(a) even as interpreted in Westinghouse.
21. "Any controversy concerning unfair labor practices may be submitted to the
Board, ...but nothing herein shall prevent the pursuit of legal or equitable relief in
courts of competent jurisdiction." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.07(1) (1957).
22. 170 F. Supp. at 950. Thus, a proceeding before the board is commenced with the
filing of a complaint to which the person complained of has a right to file an answer; the
board has a subpoena power; depositions may be taken; a record of proceedings kept:
the rules of evidence used in equity courts govern the hearings; and witnesses are paid
fees and mileage allowances identical with those paid in court actions. Ibid.; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.07(2) (1957).
The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board has conceded that Tool & Die Makers
establishes its status as a court. "While a question may remain as to whether a State
Labor Board is a court having the right of concurrent jurisdiction, we believe that the
issue has been settled ... by Judge Tehan in Machinist Lodge 78 v. General Electric
Co." John Deere Horicon Works of Deere & Co., 2 LAn. L. REP. (45 L.R.R.M.) 1171,
1.173 (Wis. Empl. Rel. Bd. Nov. 23, 1959).
23. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.07(7) (1957) ; 170 F. Supp. at 950.
The tribunal's authority to issue binding orders and to enforce them has, to most courts,
been a crucial factor in determining the tribunal's status as administrative or judicial. In
Commissioners of Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 257 U.S. 547 (1922),
nonjudicial proceedings were employed, but because the forum's order was binding, con-
clusive, and incontestable, except by direct attack on appeal, it was held to be exercising
judicial powers.
Most agencies must seek enforcement'through state courts. See 3 DAvis § 23.07. But
see N.H. S. Bill No. 37, Jan. 1935 Sess., in 110 A.L.R. 820. This should not be the sole
criterion, however. If all the state court does is rubbei'-stamp the agency's orders, the
rights of the parties are, for all practical purposes, determined solely by that agency. See
note 56 infra.
Another factor which commentators have considered significant is that the agency can
regulate prospectively as well as retrospectively. GELLHORN & BYSE, op. cit. supra note
15, at 4. The determination of future, as opposed to present, rights has been thought to
reveal an administrative rather than a judicial function. See Holsinger, Procedures and
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defeat a defendant's right to remove by creating an administrative agency and
dividing the judicial function between that agency, which is to determine ques-
tions of law and fact, and a court, which is to enforce the board's ruling.2 4
Moreover, the court felt that its holding was strengthened by the fact that,
under Lincoln Mills,25 the state agency would have had to apply federal sub-
stantive law to the alleged contract breach.2 0
The court took account of the congressional policy behind removal juris-
diction and apparently attempted to fashion generally applicable principles
for determining when an agency is to be deemed a "court"; but the opinion,
on its face, failed to consider the state's purpose in partially jettisoning tradi-
tional notions of the judicial process through the establishment of an admini-
strative agency-a purpose which removal might thwart. Of possible purposes,
most important is the expertise which can be developed by the members of an
agency as a result of extensive experience with case law, statutes, and technical
facts in a particular area.2 7 This expertise permits the legislature to delegate
more discretion in passing upon violations and tailoring remedies than is
usually accorded a court.2 8 Or, an administrative structure may have been
erected to enable the decisionmaker to conduct independent factual investiga-
tions so that all relevant information will be available ;-20 many cases in-
Practice Before the Californtia State Water Rights Board, 45 CA i.. L Rnv. 676, 677
(1957).
24. 170 F. Supp. at 950-51.
But the legislature of a state cannot, by making special provisions for the trial
of particular controversies, nor by declaring such controversies to be special pro-
ceedings and not civil suits at law or in equity, deprive the federal courts of juris-
diction nor prevent a removal .... Courts will look beyond forms to the substance,
and from it determine whether a controversy, in its essential nature, is a suit at
law or in equity, as understood by courts of the United States.
In re Jarnecke Ditch, 69 Fed. 161, 163 (D. Ind. 1895). See also Union Terminal Ry.
v. Chicago, B. & 1Q.RRP, 119 Fed. 209, 215 (W.D. Mo. 1902) ; Colorado Midland Ry. v.
Jones, 29 Fed. 193, 196 (C.C.D. Colo. 1886).
25. Textile Workers v. Lincoln l1flls, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. 170 F. Supp. at 951.
27. "The need to bring 'to bear upon difficult social and economic questions the
attention of those who have time and facilities to become and remain continuously in-
formed about them' is a major reason for the creation of agencies." Auerbach, Should
Administrative Agencies Perform, Adjudicatory Funclions, 1959 iVms. L. REv. 95,
106; ,see 1 DAvis § 1.05, at 37-39; GELL oRN & BysE; op. cit. sitpra note 15; Katcher,
supra note 15; Wiegel, Preliminary Report on Plans for Inquiry Into the Wisdom of a
California Automobile Accident Commission, 34 CA.. S.BJ. 393 (1959) ; cf. Frankfurter,
mtpra.pote 4, at 520.
28., See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 101.10(5) (1957), charging the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission with the duty to "ascertain, fix and order such reasonable standards, rules
or regulations for the construction, repair and maintenance of places of employment
and public buildings as shall render them safe." See Emmerglick, A Century of the New
Eqaity, 23 TExAs L. REy. 244, 248, 255 (1945).
29. See, e.g., I re Willow Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 613-14, 144 Pac. 505, 514 (1912):
In a proceeding before the board, provision is made for an impartial examination
and measurement of the water in a stream . . . and for the gathering of other
1960]
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volve a public interestbeyond that of the immediate parties, which may 'be
overlooked in a wholly adversary proceeding. Legislatures have also estab-
lished agencies so that claimants may avoid the delay usually attending judicial
proceedings.30 These advantages will be lost whenever an action is removed
to a federal court. On the other hand, the fact that an agency has some ad-
vantage over a court should not automatically defeat removal. While the right
to remove has been limited, and in some situations eliminated, Congress has
always believed it important enough to be retained in most cases.,1 And
removal from an agency would seem justified by the same principles which
allow removal from a court.3 2 Thus, a determination of whether a state agency
is a 1441 "state court" should be reached by weighing the state's reason
for creating the agency against Congress' purposes in granting the right to
remove.
The Tool & Die Makers court's invocation of Lincoln Mills may 'have been
an attempt to strike that balance. Perhaps the court used this case for the
proposition that removal should be readily granted when questions of federal
labor law are involved, either because federal courts are more competent than
state courts to formulate such law or because federal decisions will promote
uniformity. But nothing in Lincdln Mills, nor the gloss that 'has developed on
essential data by the state engineer . . . all to be made a matter of record in the
office of the state engineer, as a foundation for such hearing and to facilitate it
proper understanding of the rights of the parties interested. Under the old pro-
cedures such information was often omitted. When measurements were made by
the various parties to a suit they were nearly always made by different methods
and were conflicting. The . . . evidence . . . being mere estimates, rendered a
determination extremely difficult for the court and of questionable accuracy and
value when made . . . . By proceeding in accordance with the statute, when the
matter is presented to the court for judicial action, it is in an intelligible form.
See Harper, Administrative Procedure Before the State Oil and Gas Board, 29 Miss.
L.J. 82, 89 (1957); LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 37-40 (1938).
30. 1 DAvis § 1.05; GELLHORN & BYSE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 3, 7. But see Wines,
Congestion and Privation, 34 CAL. S.B.J. 409 (1959).
Other advantages sought by federal and state legislatures have been in the administra-
tive agency's ability to: initiate action on its own behalf, provide continuous supervision
over the regulated area, relieve the judiciary and legislature of additional responsibilities
and avoid judicial bias against new programs of social reform. I DAvis § 1.05; GELLIIORN
& BYsE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1-7; LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 30-40; Auerbach,
Should Administrative Agendes Perform Adjudicatory Functionsf, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
95; Kuchman, The Role 6f the )Hearing Officer, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 212 (1956).
31L See notes 4 supra," 36 infra. "'
32. Judicial review of administrative determinations, whether in state Or federal
courts, may not be adeqdate to protect a litigant from 'bias before the agency. In most
states the courts, on review, are restricted to determining whether the agency's findings
are reasonable. Note 55 infra. Removal, at the review stage, probably will not enlarge
the federal court's scope of inquiry. Note 54 infra. It is possible that if bias exists it
will affect the agency's determination yet will not be so blatant as to make that determina-
tion unreasonable. See generally Note, The Problem of Bias in the Administrative Pro-
cess, 4 ST. Louis L. REv. 183 (1956).
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it, compels this conclusion. In that case the Supreme Court construed section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act as requiring federal courts to apply federal
substantive law to breaches of collective bargaining agreements,3 and sub-
sequent cases have held that state courts are also required to apply federal
law to such suits.34 -The Lincoln Mills decision, however, has not been inter-
preted, either by courts or commentators, as ousting the jurisdiction of state
courts,3 5 which must, therefore, be deemed competent to formulate and apply
federal law in this area. Conceivably, the court did not intend to focus only
on labor law, but meant to suggest that federal-question cases should be re-
moved more easily than diversity cases. But the policies behind federal-
question removal do not support this favored status. A federal forum is
granted in diversity cases to protect out-of-state litigants from possible bias
in state courts.3 6 When jurisdiction is founded on a federal question and the
33. 353 U.S. at 451.
34. Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 171 F. Supp. 103 (D.
Conn. 1959) ; McCarrol v. Los .Angeles County Dist. Council, 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322
(1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958) ; see Wellington, Labor and the Federal System,
26 U. CHr. L. RIEv. 542, 557-58 (1959).
35. McCarrol v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council, supra note 34, 58 CoLuM. L Rv.
278 (1958), 26 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 474 (1958), 71 HAxv. L Ray. 1172 (1958), 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 1070 (1958), 44 VA. L. Rav. 258 (1958) ; see Wellington, supra: note 34, at 558.
36. However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is
not less true, that the Constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this subject,
or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that
it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens
and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.
Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809) (Marshall, C.J.).
"The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire), that
state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of
justice." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 345 (1816) (Story, J.). See
also Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Drainage Dist. No. 8, 253 Fed. 491, 497 (S.D. Iowa
1917) ; Union Terminal Ry. v. Chicago, B. & Q.LIL, 119 Fed. 209, 216-17 (W.D. 11o.
1902); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Betwelte United States and State
Courts, 13 CORXELL L.Q. 499, 512-14 (1928) ; Sternberg, Diversity Jurisdiction, 10 NoraM
DAM.F LAw. 219 (1935).
. Another reason for the existence of diversity jurisdiction is the alleged inadequacy
of state courts and state remedies. Professor Mooxe finds validity in this reason even
today. "This should suffice as continual support of diversity, irrespective of whether the
reason-possible discrimination by a state court against a non-resident citizen--has validity
today." 1 MooRE 0.1, at 4.Xith tfie mounting volume of litigation clogging the dockets of the federal courts,
diversity jurisdiction has been under steady attack. In 1928 Professor Frankfurter felt that
fear of local prejudice was no longer justified.
Whatever may have been true in the early days of the Union, when men felt the
strong local patriotism of the mnireaux riches, has not the time come now to recon-
sider how justifiable the apprehensions, how valid the fears? The Civil War, the
Spanish War, and the World War have profoundly altered national feeling, and the
1960]-"
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defendant is a citizen of the forum-state, the possibility of such bias does
not exist. Nor does the grant of removal in federal-question cases imply that
Congress believed the state courts incompetent to interpret federal law; when
Congress has desired to preclude state determinations of specific federal ques-
tions it 'has granted exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts.3 7 Guaranteeing
defendants access to federal courts can only be explained, therefore, as an
indication that Congress believes federal courts to be somewhat more quali-
fied than state courts but is nonetheless willing to have federal questions de-
termined by state courts if litigants so desire. The "possibly less qualified"
state court would seem to present no greater risk of harm to a defendant
than the "possibly biased" state court, and, therefore, no greater need for
removal. Behind the court's citation of Lincoln Mills, then, was probably an
idea that when a state must apply federal substantive law no particular state
interest will be defeated by removal. In the usual case, state agencies are
established to facilitate enforcement of state substantive policies and removal
would, therefore, inhibit these policies. When federal law must be applied,
only the state's procedure for applying such law is superseded.
Even if the court's partial reliance on Lincoln Mills demonstrates a deeper
analysis, the opinion rests primarily on the procedures employed by the board
and the nature of the union's action. While Tool & Die Workers was con-
cerned with a federal question, these tests would seem as applicable in a
diversity suit, and their use in the instant case may give them precedent value
for future decisions. Reliance on procedures alone would be improper. How
an agency operates is at best only one factor to be considered; more important
are the functions performed. Additionally, procedures can easily be altered;
thus, under this test, a state legislature could determine the removal status
of a forum. In this respect procedures are similar to the name given the forum
by the state legislature, a standard which federal courts have consistently held
mobility of modern life has greatly weakened state attachments. Local prejudice
has ever so much less to thrive on than it did when diversity jurisdiction was
written into the Constitution.
Frankfurter, supra at 521. Mr. Justice Frankfurter continues in this belief. Lumbermen's
Mutual Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 60 (1954) (concurring opinion). See also State-
ment of Hon. William M. Tuck, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of House Coin-
mittee on Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 5, at 4-5 (1957). But see id. at 11-12, 35-36.
In 1958 Congress partially responded to attacks on diversity jurisdiction by increasing
the jurisdictional amount to $10,000 and prohibiting the removal of actions in state work-
men's compensation cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1445 (1958).
37. Congress has granted the federal courts more-or-less exclusive jurisdiction in
several areas, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks, 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958), and
bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1958). In addition to the fear that in these areas state
courts are less qualified, Congress sought to obtain a more uniform body of law. Although
the circuits are often in conflict, it is felt that there will be less disagreement among eleven
circuits than among fifty states. Additionally, it is possible that the federal courts might
be more sympathetic toward new federal legislation than the states. Note, 70 HAv. L. REV.
509 (1957). Exclusive primary jurisdiction in certain areas is vested in federal agencies
rather than courts. 3 DAvis §§ 19.01-.09.
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cannot govern construction of the federal removal statute.-" Moreover, a pro-
cedural test would include practically all administrative agencies since, today,
courtlike procedures are widely employed.3 9 In Wisconsin, for example,
both the Public Service Commission, which regulates railroads and public
utilities, and the Industrial Commission, which supervises industrial working
conditions, use the same procedures as the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board.40 But a proceeding before an agency such as the Public Service Com-
mission may not constitute a "case or controversy," since the Supreme Court
has held that ratemalcing is a legislative, not a judicial function.4 1 Federal
courts would have no jurisdiction over such a proceeding, and the proceeding
would not be removable, regardless of whether the commission is a "court."
The second test relied on by the court was that the substantive basis of the
complaint-breach of contract-traditionally has been judicially cognizable.
While this test would eliminate the "case or controversy" problem, it would
again include most administrative agencies; in recent decades these bodies
have often assumed functions formerly exercised by courts.42 Thus, the Tool
& Die Workers criteria would allow removal from a wide variety of administra-
tive agencies without focusing on the policies underlying the establishment of a
specialized forum and the relevance of the purposes of removal in a particular
case.
38. Chicago, R-I. & Pac. R.R. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954); Mason City & Ft. D.R.R.
v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 (1907). The nonresident's removal rights cannot be defeated
by state procedures requiring him to be docketed as "plaintiff" when in fact he is defendant
nor by designating the first judicial action following an administrative proceeding an
"appeal." Chicago, If. & St. P. Ry. v. Drainage Dist. No. 8, 253 Fed. 491 (S.D. Iowa
1917) ; Wallace, Are Workmen's Compensation Cases Triable in Federal District Courts?,
7 LA. L. REv. 350, 355-57 (1947).
The Wisconsin board, in its brief as amicus curiae, urged the district court to accept
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's view that the board is administrative and does not per-
form judicial functions. Brief of Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent's Motion for Remand, p. 3. The board relied on Dairy Employees
Union v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 262 Wis. 280, 55 N.WV2d 3 (1952), also
cited in the district court's opinion. The removal statute is federal law, however, and
construction cannot be delegated to state courts. While state court decisions character-
izing the forum may be accepted, Pacific Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1915).
they are never binding, Commissioners of Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. St. Louis Sw.
Ry., 257 U.S. 547 (1922).
39. See Burton, Procedure Before Certain Agedes of the State, 17 At.A. LAw. 125,
126 (1956) ; Wallace, supra note 38, at 354; Harper, Administratie Procedure Before
the State Oil and Gas Board, 29 Miss. LJ. 82 (1957).
40. Wis. STAT. AN. §§ 101.11, 101.20-22, 195.03, 196.26, 196.32-.34, 196.36 (1957).
41. Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428, 443 (1923) ; Prentis v. Atlantic
Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 225 (1908) ; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902).
The Constitution in no way limits or restricts the power of the states to combine legislative
and judicial functions in a single body. The judicial power of the federal court, however,
is limited to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; ef. Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
42. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. See generally GEumnoax & BysE, op.
cit. supra note 15, at 1-7.
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The state's view of the agency's importance may be persuasive evidence of
whether its work is peculiarly suited to nonjudicial proceedings. Occasion-
ally, for example, an administrative is an alternative to, and does not supplant,
existing judicial forums. In the principal case, for example, the union forwent
the opportunity to obtain breach-of-contract damages in a time-consuming
court action to seek immediate relief from the board. Thus the state has pro-
vided plaintiffs with tactical options which removal would eliminate. But
since the state has not made the agency the exclusive forum no overriding state
interest requiring administrative determinations may exist; this possibility
would be less likely if the agency is the exclusive forum in practice, if not
in theory. Official state opinion of an agency's status may also be revealed
by the powers granted it and the weight given its findings upon judicial re-
view. Unless the agency has been provided with broad investigatory powers.
the right to initiate proceedings on its own motion, and the authority to
participate actively in the hearings, the state has not fully utilized its potential
advantages. 43 Similarly, provision for de novo review seems to imply that the
agency performs no function which could not be performed as well by a
court. 44 In most cases, however, no factors suggesting that the agency in
question is not important in the state's eyes will be present, and the federal
court will have to rely on other grounds in deciding whether to allow removal.
Most significant is the complexity of the subject matter dealt with by the
agency; federal courts are necessarily less expert in certain areas than ad-
ministrative agencies. 45 The states have long deemed administrative bodies
more competent than courts to supervise land condemnation, public utilities,
natural resources, and railroads.46 More recently, many states have established
agencies in the areas of industrial working* conditions, workmen's compensa-
tion, and labor relations. 47 That these problems have, by many states as well
as by the federal government,48 been delegated to administrative bodies is
indicative of the need for an administrative determination. But this factor
cannot be conclusive, because the agency may have been created only to relieve
43. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
44. See note 57 infra.
45. Cf. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (exceedingly complex problems
involved in allocating resources of particular oil-pool justify federal court's refusal to
hear suit seeking to enjoin action of Texas Railroad Commission, which is charged with
broad resporsibility of regulating Texas oil and gas industry).
46. See cases cited notes 8, 10, 12 supra.
47. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 50-104; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-101 to -128
(1958) ; DzL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 101-09 (1953) ; Onio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4101.00-.99,
4121.17 (Page 1954) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 101, 131-34 (1952); TEXAS CIVIL CoDE
ANN. art. 8307 (1956); WASte. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.17.010, 43.22.050, 51.04.010-.020
(1951) ' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2494 (1955).
48. See 24 Stat. 383 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1958) (creation of Inter-
state Commerce Commission) ; 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1958) (National
Labor Relations Board); 64 Stat. 1265 (1950), 16 U.S.C. 792 (1958) (Federal Power
Commission).
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state trial dockets or deprive litigants of jury trials; neither of these reasons
seems sufficient to defeat the right of removal.40 On the other hand, federal
courts should not allow removal from a new type of agency only because it
is novel. Such a policy would too severely restrict state innovation and ex-
perimentation.50 For example, agencies may be created to hear automobile
negligence cases. While these actions have traditionally been heard by courts,
proponents of such agencies argue that problems such as damages could be
more competently handled by a body of experts.r' Federal courts should
hesitate to extend the disrupting affects of removal jurisdiction before con-
sidering whether the administrative process offers unique advantages in the
cases before them.
It might be argued that removal should never be allowed before the agency
has made a determination, since removal would always be available at the
judicial-enforcement stage. Invariably review of administrative orders is pro-
vided as of right in state courts.52 And despite arguments that a district court
would be exercising appellate, rather than original, jurisdiction, removal has
usually been allowed from a reviewing state court.5 3 But removal at this stage
may not fully protect defendants' right to a federal forum. The scope of review
49. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 5-5 (1958). For an
analogous situation in another context, see 1 MooaE ff 0.317[6], at 3538 (1959).
50. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280, 311 (1933) (dissenting
opinion of Brandeis, J.).
51. See Wiegel, supra note 27; N.H. S. Bill No. 37, Jan. 1935 Sess., in 110 A.L.R.
820.
But the primary purpose in establishing agencies in the area seems to be to relieve
greatly overcrowded trial dockets by eliminating jury trials. See Wiegel, supra note 27;
N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1959, p. 5, col. 6. Many individuals will undoubtedly seek removal
just so they may have a jury trial in a federal court, and removal would apparently be
proper. Cf. Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 (1954); McLaughlin
v. Western Union Tel. Co., 7 F2d 177 (E.D. La. 1925) ; Otis, "Gvernor of the Trial"
or "Referee at the Game," 21 J. Ams. JuD. Soc'" 105 (1937) ; 29 TUL. L. RW. 788 (1955).
52. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANxx. § 227.16 (1957) ; see 1 DAvis § 1.09, at 74; Netterville,
Judicial Review: The "Independent Judgient" Anomaly, 44 CAL. L. REy. 262 (1956);
Wallace, Are Workmen's Compensation Cases Triable in Federal District Courts?, 7 L.
L. RX'. 350 (1947).
53. Removal is available only in actions "of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958). Quite often, when removal
is sought at the enforcement level, the party seeking remand argues that the proceeding
is an appeal and that the district court has no authority to act in an appellate capacity.
The courts' answer to this argument is that the proceeding before the board %vas admin-
istrative and became judicial only when appealed to the state court. Thus the filing of a
petition for review in the state court was the first, original act of a judicial nature. The
courts reach this conclusion regardless of whether the state has designated the state
court review an "appeal." See note 38 supra; Range Oil Supply Co. v. Chicago, R.I.
& Pac. R.R., 140 F. Supp. 283 (D. Minn. 1956) ; In re Judicial Ditch No. 24, 87 F. Supp.
198 (D. Minn. 1949). But this response is unsatisfactory in one respect; it does not
answer the argument that the review proceeding is not original in that it could not have
been-brought in the federal court in the first instance. See note 10 supra; Collins v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 129 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mo. 1955).
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in federal courts is usually limited to that prescribed by the state ;1 while
this review varies from near-total acceptance of the agency's findings to
complete substitution by the court of its own conclusions, in most states the
court scrutinizes agency findings of fact only to ensure their reasonableness.""
Should the federal court also adopt a "substantial evidence" test, removal only
at the enforcement stage would defeat whatever policies underlie removal.
For example, the bias against out-of-state litigants which diversity removals
seek to remedy may be incorporated in what appear to be reasonable findings. 0
A federal court could afford full protection by granting a trial de novo, with
little or no weight given the administrative determination. But this procedure
would render nugatory the advantages contemplated by the state in establish-
ing the agency and restricting review of its orders. " Thus, the scope of federal
review, as well as the right to remove from the agency itself, should turn
upon the importance of these advantages.
54. This was the basic premise in Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 573 (1940). See also In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 50 F.2d 430 (D.
Minn. 1931); Day v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 45 Fed. 82 (N.D. Iowa 1891).
55. 4 DAvis § 29.01, at 114.
56. See Katcher, Are Administrative Agencies Usurping Judicial Powers?, 30 N.Y.S.B.
BuLL. 442, 445 (1958) ; see note 32 supra.
57. "Even if a de novo judicial review is held to cure administrative deficiencies from
the standpoint of due process, the resulting system is not necessarily sound or desirable.
Administrative hearings are often to be preferred to judicial hearings on review." I DAVis
§ 7.10, at 451. "A reviewing court usurps the agency's function when it sets aside the ad-
ministrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the com-
mission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for
its action." Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946).
